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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I approach Venturinha’s ideas on contextual 
epistemology from the perspective of linguistic practices of argumentation. I 
point to the “thick” descriptions of social situations as a common context in 
which our epistemic language-games take place. In this way, I explore promising 
connections of Venturinha’s work to key concepts in recent speech act theory, 
social ontology and social epistemology.  
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1. Arguments and Enthymemes  
Nuno Venturinha’s erudite book Description of Situations1 seeks to solve one of the 
perennial epistemological puzzles—can we find a solid ground for what we call 
knowledge in the space between epistemic fundamentalism and skepticism?—
through a defense of a Wittgenstein-inspired contextualist approach. In view of 
Venturinha’s expertise in Wittgensteinian philosophy,2 this inspiration is not only 
unsurprising but also fruitful, as it lets him sketch an original form of contextualist 
epistemology grounded in linguistic practices. 
Given the immense scope of the problems discussed, this brief book is a tour 
de force of concise exposition and tightly controlled argument. As a result, much 
remains implicit. The inevitable gaps can be filled by a principle-of-charity 
wielding reader and treated as intriguing enthymemes. However, in a compact text 
where lengthy elaborations are verboten, and detail is at times scarce, some of 
                                                        
1 Nuno Venturinha, Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology (Cham: 
Springer, 2018). 
2 E.g., Nuno Venturinha (ed.), The Textual Genesis of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations 
(New York: Routledge, 2013). 
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these enthymemes are hard to accommodate. Before I get to the gist of my 
commentary, let me briefly go through two examples, one from the opening and 
one from closing passages of the book. On p. 4 Venturinha speaks of permissibility 
and near-permissibility and refers to the classic work of David Lewis3 on score-
keeping in language games. Venturinha is of course aware his own argument on 
(near-) permissible uses of language in describing actions connects to Lewis’s point 
only by analogy, rather than substance, and offers this disclaimer: “Lewis is 
specifically interested in conversational rules that the speakers of any language can 
shift”4 (rather than in general (near-) permissibility of action-attributions 
Venturinha discusses).  
Even if analogical, this argument is inaccurate. Lewis’s rules of 
accommodation for permissibility, with the master permitting the slave to do 
certain actions, show how conversational rules, underlain by social conventions for 
the working of performatives (notably, those related to the status of authority), can 
be used to introduce changes to the social context by means of necessary 
accommodation. What shifts with a master’s utterance such as “You can leave 
now” are not the rules of the conversation itself but the public conversational 
score—and, in result, the social context, including mutual rights and obligations 
governed by newly accommodated norms (the slave can go have his beer rather 
than wash the master’s feet). With the aim of elucidating Austin’s puzzle of 
performative speech—“how saying can make it so”—Lewis thus explains that “the 
boundary [of permissible actions] shifts […] so as to make the master’s statement 
true.”5 In this way, the world catches up with the language, rather than the 
language with the world. Exploring this detail further, however, might be 
stimulating for Venturinha’s own approach. In her analysis of Lewis’s 
permissibility, Langton has argued that through the master’s orders (“you can,”“you 
cannot”) “an ought of some kind does come into being, through a rule of 
accommodation: a local ought, relative to a context or practice, which itself stands 
in need of evaluation; perhaps a practice-internal ought, which depends, for its 
standing, on the worth of the practice itself.”6 The curious interplay of practice-
internal and practice-external considerations is very much in line with 
Venturinha’s contextualist perspective, both in epistemic and moral contexts.  
                                                        
3 David Lewis, “Scorekeeping in a Language Game,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1979): 339–
359. 
4 Venturinha, Description of Situations, 4. 
5 Lewis, “Scorekeeping in a Language Game,” 341. 
6 Rae Langton, “How to Get a Norm from a Speech Act,” The Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 10 
(2015): 1–33, here 27–28. Available online: http://www.amherstlecture.org/langton2015/.  
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On to the second example. When discussing the practical moral solution to 
the contextualist puzzles (how to maneuver between epistemic fundamentalism 
and skepticism), Venturinha writes: 
If my account is right, then it seems as if no action could be considered essentially 
wrong for there would always be a reason to justify it, the reason that led the 
agent to decide that way.7 
In the final passages of the book, Venturinha solves this puzzle by the application 
of his Disclosure Principle and the resultant self-evaluation of the agent leading to 
her profound feeling of either moral peace or torment. However, this might not 
have been necessary. This sentence—again, clearly an enthymematic shortcut—
forgoes the distinction between the motivating reason and the justifying reason for 
action. The former is a reason “of” the action, a cause that moves the agent to do φ, 
whether consciously or not. The latter is a reason “for” the action, the public 
grounding the agent furnishes to defend the rationality of her action. These two 
types of reason can, of course, coincide: I might want to employ person X precisely 
because I genuinely find X the best candidate, given the official criteria and the 
extensive documentation of candidates X, Y, and Z, which the job committee has 
duly scrutinized. However, I can also give X a preference because he’s quite cute 
or, to use Searle’s example, is my old drinking buddy. All this while officially 
justifying my decision by arguing this is the most hard-working, etc., candidate. In 
the latter case, “the reason that led me to decide that way” could—even should—
“be considered essentially wrong” and I can feel all the resulting moral regret 
Venturinha is describing (plus the public censure or even punishment, if the gap 
between the actually motivating and the publicly presented justifying reason is 
revealed). Venturinha’s brief discussion of akrasia goes some way toward solving 
this tension8—and it would be thrilling to see a more complete version of his 
argument elaborated within his overall contextualist proposal.  
2. Thick Descriptions of Social Reality  
Since I find such details to be what they are—mere details—they do not 
significantly distract from the overall argument of Venturinha’s essay. This 
argument sets off immediately in the opening sentence of the essay—“I am 
working at a table”—meant to serve as a guiding example for a contextual 
“description of situation,” as the title of the essay has it. Description, however, is a 
                                                        
7 Venturinha, Description of Situations, 94. 
8 See Javier González de Prado, “Akrasia and the Desire to Become Someone Else: Venturinha on 
Moral Matters,” Philosophia 48 (2020): 1705–1711.  
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tricky task—and Venturinha, via his detailed linguistic analysis, diligently goes 
through different aspects of this trickiness. Let me focus on the chief activity here, 
namely, that of “working.” What is “working”? Well, it is not not working, we are 
rightly told,9 but in this negative “not working” we have some distant activities 
(“swimming in the pool”) and some neighboring activities (“tidying up the desk”). 
An important passage ensues:  
And “tidying up the desk” can obviously be taken as “working” if we generalize 
the description, especially if we do not take “working” to be the specific task of 
“writing philosophy.” We come to grasp the meaning of W not merely by 
contrasting it to that of A, B, C, etc., but by calculating what can count as W from 
a set of contextually acceptable instances of W ranging from W1 to Wn. That 
explains why we do not indefinitely go on to stipulate what W is not (A, B, C, 
etc.). This negative infinity is not processed by us, who focus instead on a 
circumscribable number of positive possibilities that the context in question 
elects. An extraordinarily complex interpretation is made at all times and it is 
through this framework that we organize reality. There is nothing like “working” 
in itself. What counts as such is something we lay down in our multifaceted 
linguistic practices.10 
Many important things happen in this passage and I will have hardly anything 
more to say about Venturinha’s argument than what I can extract from it. Imagine 
the situation: a man is sitting at a table, looking at something (a book, a notebook, a 
computer screen, a keyboard), moving his hands in certain ways between some of 
these objects (say, a book and a keyboard). What is that man doing? Or, as 
Venturinha puts it, what does his doing “count as”? Venturinha spoils the surprise 
and tells us in the third word of the book that the man is working. However, 
tidying up the desk is another possible description; playing a strategy computer 
game is another option; and so is exercising his wrists; testing his new keyboard; 
filling out a tax return form; learning a foreign language; planning holidays; etc. 
All of these can be “contextually acceptable” descriptions of the current situation. 
Depending on the description, the situation gets ever more complex (he can be 
instructing his colleague how to fill out a tax form; practicing how to instruct him, 
etc.). But at the very least we have two levels of description: (1) that of directly 
observable body movements in a specified time and location; (2) that of what these 
particular body movements “mean” or “count as” in this situation. Gilbert Ryle, in 
his well-known distinction, calls (1) “thin” descriptions while (2) are called “thick” 
                                                        
9 Venturinha, Description of Situations, 3. 
10 Ibid. 
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descriptions.11 A boy twitching his right eye might be simply… (1) twitching his 
eye (due to a nervous tic, perhaps), but he might also be (2) winking; parodying 
someone else’s wink; or even rehearsing how to parody someone else’s wink. 
Similarly, a composer sitting at a piano might be (1) touching on the piano keys, 
thereby producing sounds but also (2) cancelling, modifying, assembling, 
reassembling, rehearsing, etc., parts of his “Hungarian Rhapsody” in the making.12 
Venturinha’s philosopher “working at a table” is in a similar situation: he is moving 
his hands over the keyboard, but also possibly doing any of the things mentioned 
above—plus, possibly, writing a commentary on Venturinha’s book.  
Ryle does not put it this way himself, but (1) largely correspond to what 
logical empiricists would call “protocol” or “observation sentences:” directly 
experienced, brute descriptions of empirical reality. (2) is not only a thicker but 
also a trickier description: indeed, “[a]n extraordinarily complex interpretation is 
made at all times and it is through this framework that we organize reality. There 
is nothing like ‘working’ in itself. What counts as such is something we lay down 
in our multifaceted linguistic practices.”13 Three elements here—“framework that 
we organize reality,” “counts as,” and “our multifaceted linguistic practices”—all 
point in one direction, namely that of social ontology.14 “X counts as Y in context 
C,” as the general formula for constitutive rules allowing for the imposition of 
socially recognizable status functions on objects, actions, or persons, is the very 
cornerstone of Searle’s social ontology. In the thick social context of organized 
labor, job contracts, universities, publishing houses, royalties, scientific production 
indicators, etc. etc., moving one’s hands over a table may count as “writing 
philosophy” and this, further, as “working” (clearly in Professor Venturinha’s case; 
for someone different, for instance an aspiring aristocrat-philosopher, “writing 
philosophy” would rather count as pastime). Indeed, within this framework that 
we organize social reality, we constantly engage in our multifaceted linguistic 
                                                        
11 Gilbert Ryle, “Thinking and Reflecting,” in The Human Agent: Royal Institute of Philosophy 
Lectures, vol. I, 1966–1967 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1968), repr. in Collected Papers, 
Volume 2: Collected Essays 1929–1968(London: Routledge, 2009), 479–493; “The thinking of 
Thoughts: What is ‘Le Penseur’ doing?”, University Lectures 18 (1968), repr. in Collected Papers, 
Volume 2: Collected Essays 1929–1968  (London: Routledge, 2009), 494–510. 
12 Ryle, “Thinking and Reflecting,” 491.  
13 Venturinha, Description of Situations, 3. 
14 See esp. John R. Searle, Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Raimo Tuomela, Social Ontology: Collective 
Intentionality and Group Agents (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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practices to negotiate and modulate the meaning of underdetermined, dynamic 
social concepts such as those of “working.”15 
All this has direct relevance to Venturinha’s essay. Social reality pops up 
throughout his argument, sometimes in unexpected places. When discussing the 
conceptual dependence of direct empirical evidence on what Wittgenstein called 
hinges—“the necessary evidence to situate us in experience regulating what is and 
is not subjected to doubt”16—Husserl proto-proto-doxa, and Gil primary evidence, 
he resorts to the following example: 
If I present my passport to produce evidence of my identity, an extensive field of 
primary evidence will keep on working beneath that proof. It is this horizon of 
prima facie evidence that is under scrutiny. […] What is at issue is not the 
verifiable existence or truth of a certain thing—e.g. my passport—but what 
allows me to hold a certain thing—again, my passport—to exist or to be true.17 
“What allows my passport to exist,” “an extensive field of primary evidence 
working beneath” is, again, the thick background of social reality: nation-states, 
borders, citizenship rules, international agreements on the rules of entry, 
immigration officers, business or leisure travel, etc. According to Searle,18 the social 
world is ontologically subjective: it exists only thanks to subjective intentional acts 
of individual human beings, who decide, for instance, that this type of a small 
notebook with a picture counts as a passport, but this one as a vaccination record. 
(The ontologically objective natural world would by contrast exist as well without 
any human experience, as argued by Venturinha too.) However, it is epistemically 
objective: it consists largely of subject-independent facts which could be subjected 
to objective inquiry, e.g., in sociology or economics. That this document is a 
passport and not a vaccination card is not a subjective experience of an 
immigration officer, but a fact that we both need to recognize—and if we don’t, we 
can go through the motions of public reason, perhaps in a court, to settle this fact. 
(Epistemically subjective perceptions—“your passport looks red in this light, 
strange…”—are, again, carefully described by Venturinha via the classic work of 
Descartes, Kant, Husserl, and others.) Why mention this? Well, descriptions can be 
(epistemically) objective or subjective, and situations can be (ontologically) 
objective or subjective too. So we have four scenarios here: objective descriptions 
of the objective, natural world (e.g., natural sciences); objective descriptions of the 
                                                        
15 See Peter Ludlow, Living Words: Meaning Underdetermination and the Dynamic Lexicon 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
16 Venturinha, Description of Situations, 52. 
17 Ibid., 53. 
18 Searle, Making the Social World. 
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subjective, social world (e.g., social sciences); subjective descriptions of the 
objective, natural world (e.g., a still nature painting); subjective descriptions of the 
subjective, social world (e.g., a personal, historical narrative). I am not sure 
Venturinha is clear enough about which type of “descriptions of situations” he is 
focusing on: All of them? Some of them?  
3. Propositions and Language Games  
In any case, the inevitable background of social reality clearly has relevance to 
Venturinha’s objectives, materials and methods. The deliberately chosen material 
from which he starts is a single “ordinary proposition” and the avowed method 
that of a first-person singular introspection, eternalized in the work of Descartes, 
Kant, and Husserl, some of the main characters in the story.19 
Venturinha openly follows Wittgenstein in the methodological belief that: 
[N]ew work should depart from “the analysis of an ordinary proposition, for 
example ‘there is a lamp on my table’,” inasmuch as “we should be able to get 
everywhere from there.” This, Wittgenstein added, would be in agreement with a 
conviction he was forming in himself according to which his volume should 
proceed from “a description of nature,” something specified as “the description of 
a situation,” with this containing “the material for all the rest” (Vienna Edition, 
vol 3, MS 110: 243, my translation). Although his later writings exhibit traces of 
this methodology, possibly consisting of the first experiment in contextualist 
epistemology, there is no item in Wittgenstein’s Nachlass that corresponds 
specifically to the pathway proposed in that remark.20 
Note here that “there is a lamp on my table” is, on the most straightforward 
interpretation, a protocol sentence that needs (and allows for) no more than a thin 
description of the ontologically objective world: “a description of nature.” No 
tricky, socially recognizable as something entity is being involved here—perhaps 
beyond the “myness” of the table, which might presuppose the notion of private 
ownership, but not necessarily so (“my” might just as well signify a temporary 
possessive, such as when “my table” in the library is the one that I just put my 
books on and sat at). This, we might say, is a crucial delimitation of Wittgenstein 
here, one that spares him the trouble of getting into the Pandora’s box of thick 
descriptions, descriptions of society. This delimitation is, however, also a serious 
limitation, and one he became acutely aware of when working toward 
Philosophical Investigations. There, as we all know, rather than a single ordinary 
proposition describing nature, Wittgenstein chose as a point of departure the 
                                                        
19 See Venturinha, Description of Situations, chapters 8, 9, and 10, respectively. 
20 Ibid., ix–x. 
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language “meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant 
B”21 and, consequently, a language-game, “the whole, consisting of language and 
the activities into which it is woven.”22 Wittgenstein perhaps realized that the 
project of departing from a single proposition—the basic method of logical 
analysis, esp. around the 1930s—is a futile project. Instead, in order to investigate 
the connection between language and situation, the underlying theme of 
Venturinha’s essay, we need to take a wholly different perspective, that of 
language games and forms of life that determine our uses of language all the way 
down to single sentences and words. 
Venturinha is, of course, aware of all that. He duly acknowledges “the 
difficulties associated to a view that turns on an internalist axis”23 and agrees with 
Wittgenstein that: 
As soon as we begin to question our situation, we see that the natural perspective 
we have of ourselves and the world is grounded on evidence that did not result 
from an inquiry. It is precisely a natural evidence, one that was acquired, as the 
later Wittgenstein would have it, in the “practice of language.”24 
Indeed, the closing chapters of the book (11 and 12) clearly look toward the social 
aspect of language, public reason, and moral social commitment as the solution to 
the initial puzzle. This, however, generates a certain tension in the philosophical 
method and orientation, namely that between the first-person phenomenological 
epistemology and the third-person social ontology (compare Descartes’s “I” 
descriptions with Ryle’s “he,” late Wittgenstein’s “they,” and Searle’s and 
Tuomela’s “we” descriptions of situations). Via his Wittgensteinian inspiration, 
Venturinha maneuvers between the two—like so many philosophers before him, 
notably Husserl—but at times the results remain unclear. 
4. Argumentation: Defeaters and Presumptions  
In his closing argument, Venturinha addresses another crucial tension of his essay, 
namely the one between contextualism and objectivism. Returning once again to 
Wittgenstein’s hinges, he claims the following:  
The acquisition and use of what I have called key epistemic operators are for him 
subordinated to the natural course of our lives and not to any social 
determination. That even babies apply modal categories when they take an object 
                                                        
21 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd edition by G.E.M. Anscombe and Rush 
Rhees, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), § 2. 
22 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 7. 
23 Venturinha, Description of Situations, 15. 
24 Ibid., 50. 
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as existing, looking at it or touching it, is not something caused by our 
socialization. Some animals do exactly the same at a basic level. What this shows 
is that our social dependency, with its rule-following, lies within a deeper form of 
ontological dependence which matches the very idea of human nature. This 
opens the way to conciliate the contextualism that must be conceived in order to 
render a situation epistemologically intelligible with the objectivism that a 
contextualist perspective seems to challenge, with sceptical paradoxes appearing 
in an entirely new light.25 
This passage opens several philosophically fascinating issues. Can we construct a 
defeasible but solid argument to the effect that social reality, at its bottom, 
“matches the very idea of human nature”? Can we defend some kind of 
isomorphism or correspondence between the social and the natural order? Will, for 
instance, Cohen’s “moron society” and “genius society”26 match human nature in 
relevantly similar ways in their epistemic endeavors? Would they share enough of 
common hinges to corroborate Venturinha’s objectivist argument? If, as argued 
extensively by the late Wittgenstein, Davidson and many others, our knowledge is 
essentially conceptual and thus language-dependent, would we eventually not 
need a concept of language that is different than the late Wittgenstein’s? Some 
kind of “natural” language over and above socially-determined practices of 
language? This list of hard questions can easily continue… 
One possible path to explore when facing these questions would be 
something in the spirit of an argumentative version of social epistemology, as 
developed, among others, by Goldman27 and Rescher28—but also, in a much more 
embryonic form, by Cohen,29 whose work is extensively discussed by Venturinha. 
This path, it seems, would be congenial to many of Venturinha’s ideas and 
solutions. One crucial concept here would be the counterpart of defeaters, namely 
presumption.30 While Pollock’s concept of defeaters is part and parcel of 
contextualist epistemology, Rescher argues that what is left after the relevant 
defeaters of q are successfully overcome, is not the knowledge of q, but rather 
presumptive acceptance of q, the acceptance of the so far best “truth-candidate” q. 
                                                        
25Ibid., 85. 
26 Stewart Cohen, “Knowledge, Context, and Social Standards,”Synthese 73 (1987): 3–26. 
27 Alvin I. Goldman, Knowledge in a Social World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999).  
28 Nicholas Rescher, Presumption and the Practices of Tentative Cognition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
29 Cohen, “Knowledge, Context, and Social Standards.” 
30 Marcin Lewin ́ski, “Argumentation Theory without Presumptions,” Argumentation 31 (2017): 
591–613; Rescher, Presumption and the Practices of Tentative Cognition; Maciej Witek, 




In lieu of firmer yet unattainable grounds, presumption authorizes us to reason as 
if the premises were true and as if the inference was warranted to reach a 
conclusion on which we can then proceed as if it were true.31 Importantly, this as-
ifness is not Husserl’s first-person as-ifness understood as perceptual modality 
(discussed by Venturinha on pp. 75-76), but an intersubjective as-ifness, achieved 
in collective critical testing of claims through public argumentative practices. The 
endpoint of such practices would be presumptive, intersubjectively shared 
evidence not unlike in Cohen’s proposal.32 Moreover, argumentative discussions—
as epitomized in Socratic dialectic—also bring about the all-important conceptual 
clarification, sometimes intricately indistinguishable from substantive inquiry.33 In 
this way, it is indeed Wittgenstein’s natural “practice of language” that generates 
the evidence we can intersubjectively understand and scrutinize.  
However, it is of course all too easy to create partial alternative proposals 
without taking the entire burden of proof necessary for a book. This is the privilege 
of the commentator. The privilege of the author is to have the book published and 
to go with glee through the easily refutable criticisms of commentators. I hope I 
have only produced those—otherwise, I wouldn’t have done justice to 
Venturinha’s work well done at his table. 
                                                        
31 Lewin ́ski, “Argumentation Theory without Presumptions.” 
32 Cohen, “Knowledge, Context, and Social Standards.” 
33 Donald Davidson, “Dialectic and Dialogue,” in Language, Mind and Epistemology, eds. 
Gerhard Preyer et al. (Dordrecht: Springer, 1994), 429–437; Ludlow, Living Words. 
